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The task of a keynote speaker in a contentious and diffi-
cult subject like the Washington statute is not easy. The key-
note speech is the secular equivalent of a blessing. And I, in
all modesty, have to confess that I am the ideal person to offer
a secular blessing. I have a Jewish father and an Irish mother,
so secular blessings come easy to me. When I get invited to do
keynote speeches, I'm generally clear about what I want to say.
I advance my opinions with that modesty for which economists
at the University of Chicago Law School are famous. But
today, I don't have a clear line at all. I hope my views will
develop throughout the day. Like all of you, I have prejudices
and rationalizations and imprecisions, but I don't have any
clear party line.
To begin, I thought that I would indulge myself a little in
the history of my own involvement with these questions, talk
about the relationship between the mental health power and
the criminal law power of the State, and then talk a little
about the new Washington statute.
I first came in contact with this question of what to do
with the violent sexual predator in 1948 when I went with an
English psychiatrist, Dr. Trevor Gibbon, to visit the Karolinska
Institute in Stockholm, then the leading innovator in this field.
From there, we moved down to Denmark to an institution
called Herstedvester, near Copenhagen, run by a wonderful
man, a Dr. George Sturup. I fell under his influence for many
years. He came to visit me when I was teaching in Australia
and then came to Chicago a couple of times. I translated, with
his assistance, a Danish film on that institution. Herstedvester
* Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Chicago.
518 University of Puget Sound Law Review
was one of the first institutions to be written up for the psychi-
atric treatment of serious sexual offenders. George Sturup
became either famous or notorious by virtue of the fact that
his institution performed surgical castration on what he called"volunteers." I think that they were as near to volunteers as
you could get. They were people who otherwise had been sen-
tenced for very long terms for their offenses. At that stage,
having been sentenced, George would offer them the opportu-
nity for surgical castration and for replacement in the commu-
nity with family support and job opportunities within six
months. That arrangement was about as close to volunteering
as you could get under the circumstances.
George died a couple of years ago, still believing in the
validity of his work but no longer favoring surgical castration.
He felt that the same results could be achieved by estrogen and
other chemical techniques. I had always been and remain
troubled by the castration technique, not dogmatically trou-
bled, I hope, but troubled. If I could be sure that people of
George Sturup's quality were making these treatment deci-
sions, my trouble would be small. Unfortunately, I don't think
there are many people of his capacity, quality, sensitivity, or
purity of heart to handle the terribly emotionally disturbing
problems that we're addressing in today's colloquy.
The final egotistical narrative that I want to offer relates
to the group of sexually dangerous persons currently held at
the Menard Psychiatric Facility, located some three hundred
miles south of Chicago on the north bank of the Mississippi.
Fifteen years ago, I was chairman of a gubernatorial commis-
sion on that psychiatric facility, and I arranged to visit it often
for entirely selfish reasons. I was then learning to fly little
aeroplanes, and I could get free flying time back and forth. As
I came and went, the prisoners would wave to me, and it was
rather fun. So self-interest as usual matched intellectual ambi-
tion, and I worked down there. There are still about twenty
sexually dangerous persons held in the psychiatric facility at
Menard. Of course, there's no treatment worth talking about.
It's really rather hard to get competent psychiatric treatment
to make the pilgrimage from East St. Louis across to Menard.
I think you have to do it by camel train if you don't have an
aeroplane, and putting a fine phrase upon it, treatment is an
hypocrisy. It is detention.
What are these twenty prisoners like? Well, they're the
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least disturbed group in the psychiatric facility, and they're the
most difficult to handle. They tend to be a little better edu-
cated, and they're stuck there for an enormously long time.
Fifteen years ago, we found eighteen men who had been held
illegally, all for over twenty years. They tend to be forgotten.
We got them out, a psychiatrist and I, after some collaboration
with the state authorities.
So I approach this problem with a recognition of its diffi-
culty and its political anguish, and with respect for those who
think they need to make trade-offs between political pressure
and punishment principle. I also approach this problem with a
real sense that this is not a new road we're on; it's a very old
one. I think that I know what will happen in Washington
State. Very few people will be committed, and then those
numbers will drop off, and they'll be forgotten until some new
sensational event occurs. Well, that's not a very cheerful ver-
sion, but it may have the benefit of truth. But, anyhow, Alex
Brooks' as usual will put me right, and you will be properly
guided.
Let me turn to the second theme. It is the question that
Alex tells me he will deal with later and in detail-the prob-
lem of prediction and its relationship to two powers: the
mental health power, which is essentially a civil commitment
power, and the criminal law power, which is a punishment
power. A lot of ink has been spilled on this topic. One of the
more important Supreme Court cases is the McC7eskey2 case,
in which all nine justices agreed about the best available pre-
diction for what Dr. Grigson from Texas, known as Dr. Death,
described as a sociopath, which used to be described as a psy-
chopath, which used to be described as a moral imbecile, and so
on. Before that they were called warlocks and witches, but I'm
not sure; I think they're the same people. Even for them, the
best we could do for a prediction of violence would be one true
positive prediction of danger for two false positives. Some peo-
ple have said that's bad prediction. To find a group with a base
expectancy rate of serious violence of one in three is an aston-
ishingly good prediction rate. Much better than what you will
be able to do in practice under the violent sexual predator
legislation.
1. See Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly
Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709 (1992).
2. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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But let's suppose you can predict one repeat offender in
three. The problem is that, of the three, you don't know which
one will be the repeat offender. There is no way to find out-
all three will have serious records. As a result, courts will
over-predict danger and hold all three in custody. There is no
way in which you can uncover an error, or put correctly, there
is no way in which you can ethically test the violent sexual
predator legislation.
The Supreme Court has spoken in a reasonably useful way
on two of the issues we face today, and so let me inflict three
cases on you briefly. You'll hear them again from others in
more detail.
The Backstrom v. Herold 3 case is a very interesting one on
the topic of today's symposium. This case occurred in 1966;
some folks challenged New York's practice of transferring
prisoners at the end of their term to psychiatric hospitals.
When prisoners completed their term-you'll see how this
practice was similar to your violent sexual predator legisla-
tion-the State would hold a civil commitment hearing. They
didn't call it that, but it was analogous to a civil commitment
hearing. The State would order a psychiatric interview and
psychiatric assessment. Then, if the prisoner was seen to be
still mentally ill, which is a very plastic concept, and still a
danger to others, which is also a very plastic concept, he would
be transferred either to the Dammemora or Mattewan institu-
tions and held under the civil commitment power of the State.
This practice was challenged in the Supreme Court, and
there was a firm decision that this practice resulted in an une-
qual protection of the law. The Court held that the prisoner
had served his term by way of punishment and that the protec-
tions that must be given for the transfer to the civil hospital
had to be the same as would be given to any citizen. Other,
various defects existed in the State's civil commitment hearing
process that the prisoners has just received: There wasn't a
jury trial; there wasn't representation; the transfer mechanism
was defective as well. So what the Supreme Court was saying
was there could not be, in the prison context, a hybrid classifi-
cation, which had neither the protections of criminal law nor
the protections of civil commitment.
A somewhat similar result was reached in Jackson v. Indi-
3. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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ana4 in 1972. Jackson was a deaf-mute who was charged with
stealing a purse and its contents. It still is not known whether
he actually committed the crime. Anyhow, he was found unfit
to plead. The Indiana assessment authorities decided he never
would be fit to plead. The school for the deaf said they
wouldn't take the criminal deaf for training, but of course, he
hadn't been convicted. He was being held as unfit for trial for,
in effect, a life sentence. In any event, the case reached the
Supreme Court, which held that after a reasonable time to
make Jackson fit for trial, if that could be achieved, he should
be taken to trial. If it could not be achieved, the State should
be forced to choose between civil commitment or release.
At that stage in the development of the case law, I was
fairly clear how the law stood, particularly because the United
States Supreme Court had never invalidated a sexual psycho-
path law. But a more recent case, Jones v. United States,5
shakes my confidence. In Jones, a majority of the Supreme
Court held that a person, who had pleaded not guilty by reason
of insanity and for whose offense the maximum punishment
could only be one year's imprisonment, could be held indeter-
minately if he presented a continuing danger to others and was
mentally ill. Furthermore, that person could be held by proce-
dures that are less than those required for civil commitment.
In other words, I do not think that Backstrom v. Herold
and Jones v. United States are reconcilable. In that situation,
given the Supreme Court's record on sexual psychopath laws,
given the recency of the Jones decision, and given the fact that
the Supreme Court of the United States in its capital punish-
ment jurisprudence has simply become a political body, not a
legal body at all-this material is not capable of legal analysis;
it's only capable of political understanding-then I think it is
quite likely that, if the matter reaches the Supreme Court,
your violent sexual predator law will be held constitutional.
Now, is that an important point? Not really. It's an interesting
point, or I hope you think it's interesting. But the important
question is: "Is it wise?" not "Is it Constitutional?" Not every-
thing that's constitutional is wise, and not everything that is
unconstitutional is unwise.
What are the problems here? The person who has had the
greatest influence on my thinking about these problems is
4. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
5. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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Karl Popper, a person whom some of you will know. At the
age of 87, he gave a lecture called A World of Propensities,
which I recommend. I've come to see almost all human rela-
tionships as problems of propensities and their fortuitous act-
ing out. The first problem about propensities is a question that
I briefly alluded to: "What is a good prediction and what is a
bad prediction?" Put in more concrete terms, how can one
predict that "beyond a reasonable doubt" a person is likely to
commit a crime of violence? I don't know what that means. I
think it can be given meaning, but only if it is expressed in
terms of some base expectancy rate. That is to say, some pre-
cise statement as to the proportion of this group that will be
involved in violence. Then we could make the moral judg-
ment-because it is a moral judgment. That moral judgment is
how many false positives can be justified for the avoidance of
one true positive.
And our present knowledge of this proportion is fairly
slight. I mean, these are great chaps they've got on this plat-
form today, with one exception; but, strictly between ourselves,
they don't know very much about hard numbers. Not because
they're not good; they're probably as good as anyone. The sim-
ple fact is that mankind doesn't know a great deal about this
world of propensities. One of the ways we protect ourselves is
by overpredicting risk. It's easy to overpredict risk. The per-
son you're predicting about has a dreadful record. There's no
way of being sure he's safe. And while you keep him locked
up, you can't be proved wrong. The only way that you can
lapse into political error is to take a risk. Put in accurate
terms, Willie Horton is going to happen in every system where
there's discretion. That's why its use as a political ploy was so
improper. Because we just don't have the ability to prevent all
future violence-unless you lock up all people at risk perma-
nently-we just don't have the capacity to predict.
Now let me come briefly to the Washington statute.
Maine, Washington, and Minnesota are seen by those of us in
the trade as states with rational, thoughtful, humane sentenc-
ing practices, as amongst the leaders. You clearly are. In the
book that Michael Tonry and I wrote on intermediate punish-
6ments, we wrote at length about the wisdom and the quality
of your community-based treatments for sexual offenders.
6. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON & PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990).
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Incidentally, in those three states, sexual offenders are also the
modal group in prison. This isn't any change in human behav-
ior; it's a change in human reaction to the behavior of others.
It's a change in political and social attitude, not in human sex-
ual behavior. Since you've got a background of leadership in
community-based treatment; therefore, I suppose, you have a
right to experiment at the other end of the spectrum.
What about this very small group of awful offenders? Can
we do anything about them? What are the moral and social
costs for doing so? I'm glad you're trying. I'm interested in it.
I do not think you should deceive yourself that you can mea-
sure it. I do not believe, given even limitless resources, that I
would know how to do a good evaluation of this program.
There are ethical and statistical reasons why it cannot be
tested. So you'll assume it works, because you'll hold people in
who look like they're very dangerous.
Well, I'll conclude by mentioning one sort of dream idea I
had last night. Let me propose the following to you: If you
really want to stop the injury to citizens, including death to
Washington citizens, then there's another group with a very,
very high rate of subsequent violence that you should turn
your mind to. They are not people who have killed. Most
murderers are not dangerous; most of them have solved their
problem. But the people that are really dangerous are people
who have carried or threatened with a gun when they commit-
ted a robbery or a burglary. Their base expectancy rate for
crime, subsequently doing great injury, is very high indeed.
Much higher than the base expectancy rates that you are deal-
ing with. Why don't we, at the end of their sentence, lock up
permanently everyone who's used a gun or carried a gun when
they commit a crime? Now, the problem with my dream is
that some damned reporter will come up to me and say, "I
don't think I got that clearly. What were you recommending?"
And I'm not. But I think it might be a stimulating thought,
and I hope it helps. My secular blessing on all of you. Thank
you.
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